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Welfare analysis of civil servants' wage bargaining in a mixed-duopoly approach

Author

Listed:
  • Kazuki Hiraga

    (Tokai University)

Abstract

This research examines how wage regulation can be Pareto-improving. We demonstrate the wage regulation of public firms by relaxing the assumption of substitution between private and public goods. In other words, we admit a complementary relationship between private and public goods. Relaxing this assumption provides results both additional to and different from those produced by other models. We find that wage regulation can be Pareto-improving under a moderately strong complementary relationship between private and public goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Kazuki Hiraga, 2015. "Welfare analysis of civil servants' wage bargaining in a mixed-duopoly approach," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(3), pages 1734-1743.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-14-01057
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2015/Volume35/EB-15-V35-I3-P177.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wage regulation model; Pareto improvement; Complementary relationship;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

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