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Unconcerned groups and the majority rule

Author

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  • Antonio Quesada

    (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)

Abstract

When preferences are defined over two alternatives, the (relative) majority rule is characterized in terms of the four axioms U, P, I, and G. U is unanimity. P is the condition that the union of two unconcerned (that is, indifferent) groups of individuals creates an unconcerned group. I asserts that the preferences of the individuals of an unconcerned group can be cancelled out without altering the result. G states that, for any sufficiently small group G that is not unconcerned and for any group H with the same size as G but without members in common with G, it is possible to make the union of G and H unconcerned.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Quesada, 2011. "Unconcerned groups and the majority rule," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(2), pages 1757-1764.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00096
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2011/Volume31/EB-11-V31-I2-P160.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Adrian Miroiu, 2018. "Single-profile axiomatizations of the plurality and the simple majority rules," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(1), pages 13-19.
    2. Adrian Miroiu, 2013. "Responsiveness axioms and the majority rule," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 740-746.
    3. Adrian Miroiu, 2020. "Coalitions of concerned voters: a characterization of the majority rule," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(4), pages 2717-2722.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social welfare function; majority rule; axiomatic characterization; two alternatives; unconcerned group.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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