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Voluntary agreements with Industries - participation incentives with industry-wide targets: a comment

Author

Listed:
  • Anne-sarah Chiambretto

    (G.R.E.Q.A.M. (UMR 6579), university of the mediterranean)

  • Hubert Stahn

    (G.R.E.Q.A.M. (UMR 6579), university of the mediterranean)

Abstract

This comment reexamines the problem of free-riding in pre-emptive collective environmental voluntary agreements (VA) analysed by Dawson and Segerson in the context of VAs with a global emission target and a pigouvian tax used as a threat. Completely remaining in the authors' framework, we here reconsider their results about efficiency. While they claim it provides the optimal amount of environmental quality but inefficiently, we show that there exists an optimal threat under which the equilibrium of the game is a cost-effective VA. This result gives an additional indication on the way VAs should be used to be efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne-sarah Chiambretto & Hubert Stahn, 2011. "Voluntary agreements with Industries - participation incentives with industry-wide targets: a comment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(1), pages 116-121.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00658
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2011/Volume31/EB-11-V31-I1-P14.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maia M. David, 2004. "Voluntary agreements as an environmental policy instrument [Les approches volontaires comme instrument de régulation environnementale]," Post-Print hal-02679944, HAL.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anne-Sarah Chiambretto & Hubert Stahn, 2017. "Voluntary Management of Fisheries under an Uncertain Background Legislative Threat," AMSE Working Papers 1712, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.

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      More about this item

      Keywords

      collective voluntary agreements; pollution control; adoption costs; political processes; distributional effects; diffuse pollution; government policy;
      All these keywords.

      JEL classification:

      • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
      • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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