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No-shirking Conditions in Frictional Labor Markets

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  • Norikazu Tawara

    (Nihon University)

Abstract

A matching model, combined with a shirking model of efficiency wages, is examined. It depends on sources of unemployment variation whether the no-shirking condition (NSC) tends to be binding as the unemployment rate is lower. When only productivity varies, the NSC tends to be binding as the unemployment rate is higher, as in Rocheteau (2001). However, when only matching efficiency varies, the NSC tends to be binding as the unemployment rate is lower.

Suggested Citation

  • Norikazu Tawara, 2008. "No-shirking Conditions in Frictional Labor Markets," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(1), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08j60002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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