IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-08h70010.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Soft Budget Constraint Problem in a Dynamic Central Leadership Model

Author

Listed:
  • Hiromasa Takahashi

    (Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University)

  • Akihiro Suzuki

    (Faculty of Literature and Social Sciences, Yamagata University)

  • Toru Takemoto

    (Faculty of Economics, Meikai University)

Abstract

The authors deal with a certain type of timing problem with the central government's allocation of subsidies to local governments, called a ``soft budget constraint (SBC) problem.'''' In fiscal science, it has been indicated that the interregional redistribution policy of the central government causes incentive problems such as excess expenditure or excess debt. However, as insignificant amount of the literature has applied a multi-period model to explain the SBC problem occuring despite the possibility of the existence of intertemporal distortion in an SBC situation. Therefore, the authors examine the problem in two-period models, which are the easiest multi-period models. The authors will demonstrate that the path of occurrence of the distortion caused by subsidization varies according to the timing of the subsidy offer.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiromasa Takahashi & Akihiro Suzuki & Toru Takemoto, 2008. "The Soft Budget Constraint Problem in a Dynamic Central Leadership Model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 8(1), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08h70010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2008/Volume8/EB-08H70010A.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kornai, J, 1979. "Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(4), pages 801-819, July.
    2. Timothy Goodspeed, 2002. "Bailouts in a Federation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 409-421, August.
    3. Nobuo Akai & Motohiro Sato, 2005. "leadership meets soft budget," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-391, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2008:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Akai, Nobuo & Sato, Motohiro, 2008. "Too big or too small? A synthetic view of the commitment problem of interregional transfers," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 551-559, November.
    3. Bouton, Laurent & Gassner, Marjorie & Verardi, Vincenzo, 2008. "Redistributing income under fiscal vertical imbalance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 317-328, June.
    4. Daniela Monacelli & Maria Grazia Pazienza & Chiara Rapallini, 2016. "Municipality Budget Rules and Debt: Is the Italian Regulation Effective?," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 114-140, September.
    5. Reingewertz, Yaniv, 2014. "Fiscal Decentralization - a Survey of the Empirical Literature," MPRA Paper 59889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Manuel E. Lago & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2024. "On the effects of intergovernmental grants: a survey," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(3), pages 856-908, June.
    7. Dietrichson, Jens & Ellegård, Lina Maria, 2015. "Assist or desist? Conditional bailouts and fiscal discipline in local governments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 153-168.
    8. Toshihiro Ihori, 2008. "Overlapping Tax Revenue, Local Debt Control and Soft-Budget Constraint," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-552, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    9. Arnt Hopland, 2013. "Central government control and fiscal adjustment: Norwegian evidence," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 185-203, May.
    10. Thushyanthan Baskaran, 2013. "Do bailouts buy votes? Evidence from a panel of Hessian municipalities," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 257-278, August.
    11. Wallace E. Oates, 2006. "On the Theory and Practice of Fiscal Decentralization," Working Papers 2006-05, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
    12. Karolina Kaiser & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2013. "The timing of elections in federations: a disciplining device against soft budget constraints?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 197-215, March.
    13. Marjorie Gassner & Laurent Bouton & Vincenzo Verardi, 2007. "Redistributing Income Under Fiscal Vertical Imbalance," LIS Working papers 420, LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg.
    14. Plachta, Robert C., 2008. "Fiscal Equalisation and the Soft Budget Constraint," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 08-8, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
    15. Foremny, Dirk & Solé-Ollé, Albert, 2016. "Who's coming to the rescue? Revenue-sharing slumps and implicit bailouts during the Great Recession," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-049, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    16. Aleh Mazol, 2015. "Local self-governance in the Republic of Belarus," BEROC Policy Paper Series 22, Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC).
    17. Wallace Oates, 2005. "Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(4), pages 349-373, August.
    18. Toshihiro Ihori, 2010. "Overlapping Tax Revenue, Soft Budget, and Rent Seeking," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-750, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    19. Karolina Kaiser, 2008. "Restricted Bailouts and the Commitment Problem in Federations," Working Papers 062, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
    20. Yaniv Reingewertz & Itai Beeri, 2018. "How effective is central enforcement? Evidence from convened committees in failing local authorities," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 36(2), pages 357-380, March.
    21. Kothenburger, Marko, 2007. "Ex-post redistribution in a federation: Implications for corrective policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 481-496, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    decentralized leadership;

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08h70010. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.