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Optimal monetary policy with skill shock

Author

Listed:
  • Ryoji Hiraguchi

    (Stanford University, Department of Economics)

Abstract

da Costa and Werning (2005) prove that the Friedman rule of setting nominal interest rate to zero is locally optimal in a monetary model where each consumer receives a privately observed skill shock and the government uses incentive compatible non-linear income taxation. In this paper, we show that when goods and money are strictly separable from labor in the consumer's utility function, the Friedman rule is the globally optimal monetary policy. Positive nominal interest rate does not improve social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryoji Hiraguchi, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy with skill shock," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 5(15), pages 1-11.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07n10001
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Iván Werning, 2007. "Optimal Fiscal Policy with Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(3), pages 925-967.
    2. Stefania Albanesi & Christopher Sleet, 2006. "Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(1), pages 1-30.
    3. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2006. "Modern Macroeconomics in Practice: How Theory Is Shaping Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 3-28, Fall.
    4. Mirrlees, J. A., 1976. "Optimal tax theory : A synthesis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 327-358, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Friedman rule;

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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