IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-07c70003.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On a Nonlinear Feedback Strategy Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game

Author

Listed:
  • Kenji Fujiwara

    (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University)

  • Norimichi Matsueda

    (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University)

Abstract

This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such a framework, the nonlinear feedback strategy can be properly defined and, furthermore, a particular type of the equilibrium outcomes approximates the bilateral collusion, as is originally proved by Tsutsui and Mino (1990) for a standard differential game with one state variable.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenji Fujiwara & Norimichi Matsueda, 2007. "On a Nonlinear Feedback Strategy Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(8), pages 1-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07c70003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2007/Volume3/EB-07C70003A.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tsutsui, Shunichi & Mino, Kazuo, 1990. "Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 136-161, October.
    2. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Halkos, George, 2009. "A Differential game approach in the case of a polluting oligopoly," MPRA Paper 23742, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Javier Frutos & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2018. "Selection of a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in a Class of Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 620-636, September.
    2. de Zeeuw, A.J., 1998. "The acid rain differential game," Other publications TiSEM f6c561bf-c603-4de7-994c-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. D. Vencatachellum, 1998. "A Differential R&D Game: Implications for Knowledge-Based Growth Models," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 96(1), pages 175-189, January.
    4. Rémy Dullieux & Lionel Ragot & Katheline Schubert, 2011. "Carbon Tax and OPEC’s Rents Under a Ceiling Constraint," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(4), pages 798-824, December.
    5. Karl-Göran Mäler & Anastasios Xepapadeas & Aart de Zeeuw, 2003. "The Economics of Shallow Lakes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(4), pages 603-624, December.
    6. Rowat, Colin, 2007. "Non-linear strategies in a linear quadratic differential game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(10), pages 3179-3202, October.
    7. Zaruhi Hakobyan & Christos Koulovatianos, 2021. "Symmetric Markovian Games of Commons with Potentially Sustainable Endogenous Growth," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 54-83, March.
    8. Bård Harstad, 2016. "The Dynamics of Climate Agreements," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 719-752.
    9. Wirl, Franz & Dockner, Engelbert, 1995. "Leviathan governments and carbon taxes: Costs and potential benefits," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 1215-1236, June.
    10. Eggert, Wolfgang & Itaya, Jun-ichi & Mino, Kazuo, 2011. "A dynamic model of conflict and appropriation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 167-182.
    11. Santiago J. Rubio Jorge & Begoña Casino, 1997. "Strategic behavior and efficiency in a groundwater pumping differential game," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    12. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:8:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Akihiko Yanase, 2009. "Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 121-140, June.
    14. Kossioris, G. & Plexousakis, M. & Xepapadeas, A. & de Zeeuw, A. & Mäler, K.-G., 2008. "Feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games in pollution control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 1312-1331, April.
    15. Ngo Long, 2015. "Dynamic Games Between Firms and Infinitely Lived Consumers: A Review of the Literature," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 467-492, December.
    16. Karl-Göran Mäler & Aart De Zeeuw, 1998. "The Acid Rain Differential Game," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(2), pages 167-184, September.
    17. Kenji Fujiwara & Norimichi Matsueda, 2009. "Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: A Generalization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 27-36, February.
    18. Luca Lambertini & Arsen Palestini, 2018. "Voluntary Export Restraints in a Trade Model with Sticky Price: Linear and Nonlinear Feedback Solutions," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 507-518, September.
    19. Kenji Fujiwara, 2009. "Why Environmentalists Resist Trade Liberalization," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 44(1), pages 71-84, September.
    20. Charles Mason & Stephen Polasky, 2002. "Strategic Preemption in a Common Property Resource: A Continuous Time Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(3), pages 255-278, November.
    21. Laukkanen, Marita & Koundouri, Phoebe, 2006. "Competition versus coopertion in groundwater extraction: A stochastic framework with heteregoneous agents," MPRA Paper 41910, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07c70003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.