A Stackelberg Game Model of Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
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References listed on IDEAS
- Tsutsui, Shunichi & Mino, Kazuo, 1990. "Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 136-161, October.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Kamien, Morton I, 1987. "Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1151-1164, September.
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Cited by:
- Masahiko Hattori & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2019. "General analysis of dynamic oligopoly with sticky price," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(4), pages 2990-2998.
- Masahiko Hattori & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2022. "Dynamic analysis of R&D in an oligopoly under general demand and cost functions," OPSEARCH, Springer;Operational Research Society of India, vol. 59(2), pages 694-710, June.
- S. S. Askar, 2020. "Duopolistic Stackelberg game: investigation of complex dynamics and chaos control," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 1685-1699, September.
- Katarzyna Kańska & Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, 2022. "Dynamic Stackelberg duopoly with sticky prices and a myopic follower," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 4221-4252, September.
- Masahiko Hattori & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2021. "Advertising in an oligopoly with differentiated goods under general demand and cost functions: A differential game approach," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(6), pages 619-639, December.
- Van Gorder, Robert A. & Caputo, Michael R., 2010. "Envelope theorems for locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria of finite horizon differential games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 1123-1139, June.
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Keywords
dynamic duopoly;JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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