IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-06d40011.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Coordinating Antitrust Policies Against International Cartels

Author

Listed:
  • Toshiji Kawagoe

    (Future University - Hakodate)

  • Hirokazu Takizawa

    (Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry)

  • Taisuke Matsubae

    (Waseda University)

  • Hiroo Iwanari

    (The Fair Trade Commission of Japan)

Abstract

Theoretical research on leniency programs has so far focused attention on cartels formed within a country the purpose of the paper is to analyze the situation where a cartel is formed internationally. We consider a model with two firms operating in two countries. The antitrust authority (AA) in each country chooses either to implement a leniency program or to use traditional investigation to detect/deter cartel activity. Given the combination of antitrust policies, the two firms play market games simultaneously in both countries. Assuming that the information on the existence of a cartel in one country spills over to the other, we analyze a strategic interdependency faced by the AAs. Several policy objectives of the AA are considered. We find that if the objective is to maximize revenues from the penalty imposed on cartels, an asymmetric equilibrium exists in which one country chooses to free-ride the other's choosing a leniency program.

Suggested Citation

  • Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa & Taisuke Matsubae & Hiroo Iwanari, 2007. "Coordinating Antitrust Policies Against International Cartels," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(25), pages 1-11.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06d40011
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2007/Volume4/EB-06D40011A.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fazel M. Farimani & Seyed Reza Mirnezami & Ali Maleki, 2019. "A Gas Cartel in the Global Market? Hype or Reality," International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, Econjournals, vol. 9(6), pages 296-304.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cartels;

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06d40011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.