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A comparison of the Dodgson method and the Copeland rule

Author

Listed:
  • Christian Klamler

    (Institute of Public Economics, Graz University, Austria)

Abstract

This paper compares binary versions of two well-known preference aggregation methods designed to overcome problems occurring from voting cycles, Copeland's (1951) and Dodgson''s (1876) method. In particular it will first be shown that the Copeland winner can occur at any position in the Dodgson ranking. Second, it will be proved that for some list of individual preferences over the set of alternatives, the Dodgson ranking and the Copeland ranking will be exactly the opposite, i.e. maximally different.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Klamler, 2003. "A comparison of the Dodgson method and the Copeland rule," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(8), pages 1-7.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-02d70014
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2003/Volume4/EB-02D70014A.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas C. Ratliff, 2001. "A comparison of Dodgson's method and Kemeny's rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 79-89.
    2. Christian Klamler, 2004. "The Dodgson ranking and its relation to Kemeny’s method and Slater’s rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 91-102, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Engin ÇAKIR, 2017. "Application of Fuzzy Multi-Criteria Decision Making Methods on Six Sigma Projects Selection," Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences, KSP Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 132-138, March.
    2. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2020. "On Some k -scoring Rules for Committee Elections: Agreement and Condorcet Principle," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(5), pages 699-725.
    3. Lamboray, Claude, 2007. "A comparison between the prudent order and the ranking obtained with Borda's, Copeland's, Slater's and Kemeny's rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-16, July.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2003:i:35:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2019. "On some k-scoring rules for committee elections: agreement and Condorcet Principle," Working Papers hal-02147735, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Copeland Rule;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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