Author
Listed:
- Philipp König
- Kerstin Bernoth
Abstract
As well as implementing the common monetary policy, the national central banks (NCBs) which, together with the European Central Bank (ECB) form the Eurosystem, are also responsible for performing a range of national tasks. Among other things, these include the management of their financial assets portfolios. To ensure that this function does not interfere with the implementation of the single monetary policy, the Agreement on Net Financial Assets (ANFA) limits the total net amount of financial assets (NFA) the NCBs are permitted to hold. National central bank purchases of government bonds under ANFA have led to public accusations that this was tantamount to covert monetary financing of fiscal deficits through the “printing press” by the national central banks. The present report first explains the Agreement on Net Financial Assets and shows the volume of securities purchased by the different NCBs under ANFA. Based on this, it examines the extent to which the accusation of monetary financing may be justified. Although there have been indications of certain national banks increasing the government bond holdings on their balance sheets in recent years, this does not provide sufficient evidence of monetary financing. However, the public debate on ANFA clearly highlights the Eurosystem’s lack of transparency, particularly that of the NCBs. To ensure that confidence in European monetary policy is not undermined and both transparency and communication are improved, more detailed information on the development of NCBs’ balance sheets must be published more regularly. Neben der Durchführung geldpolitischer Operationen nehmen die nationalen Zentralbanken des Eurosystems eine Reihe von nationalen Aufgaben in eigener Verantwortung wahr. Dazu zählt auch die Verwaltung ihrer Portfolios. Damit dies nicht in Konflikt mit der Durchführung der gemeinsamen Geldpolitik gerät, gibt das „Agreement on Net Financial Assets“ (ANFA) den nationalen Zentralbanken eine Obergrenze für ihre Nettofinanzanlagen (NFA) vor. Ankäufe von Staatsanleihen im Rahmen des ANFA haben in der Öffentlichkeit zu dem Vorwurf geführt, dass dies eine verdeckte Finanzierung fiskalischer Defizite durch die „Druckerpresse“ der nationalen Notenbanken darstelle. Dieser Bericht erläutert zunächst die NFA-Vereinbarung und zeigt auf, in welchem Umfang verschiedene nationale Zentralbanken Wertpapierkäufe im Rahmen des ANFA getätigt haben. Darauf aufbauend wird der Frage nachgegangen, inwiefern der Vorwurf monetärer Staatsfinanzierung gerechtfertigt ist. Auch wenn es Anzeichen dafür gibt, dass einige Nationalbanken in den letzten Jahren die Bestände an Staatsanleihen in ihren Bilanzen ausgeweitet haben, reicht dies nicht aus, um eine verdeckte monetäre Haushaltsfinanzierung zu belegen. Die öffentliche Debatte über das NFA-Abkommen weist allerdings auf ein deutliches Transparenzdefizit des Eurosystems, insbesondere der nationalen Notenbanken, hin. Um das Vertrauen in die europäische Geldpolitik nicht zu gefährden und Transparenz sowie Kommunikation zu verbessern, sollten Informationen über die Bilanzentwicklung der nationalen Zentralbanken detaillierter und regelmäßiger veröffentlicht werden.
Suggested Citation
Philipp König & Kerstin Bernoth, 2016.
"Verdeckte Staatsfinanzierung oder erlaubte Portfoliosteuerung? Das ANFA-Abkommen des Eurosystems,"
DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 83(12/13), pages 243-252.
Handle:
RePEc:diw:diwwob:83-12-1
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More about this item
Keywords
Monetary policy;
central banking;
financial markets;
All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
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