Author
Listed:
- Dorothea Schäfer
- Dominik Meyland
Abstract
In the wake of the European debt crisis, it has become clear that government bonds may actually be a risky form of investment. The Basel Committee and the Bundesbank have therefore opened an intense debate as to whether banks investing in EU government bonds should be subject to regulatory capital requirements in the future. Currently, banks do not need equity capital when investing in sovereign bonds. Waiving this exemption privilege would result in an additional Tier 1-capital requirement of 3.34 billion euros for the German banks studied here. This represents just under 1.8 percent of available Tier 1-capital. For French banks, the calculated capital requirement is 3.52 billion euros (a good 1.2 percent), while Swedish banks have a requirement of an additional 80.6 million euros (0.14 percent). Raising these funds is not likely to cause any major problems for banks in these countries. It is an entirely different matter for Greek banks, however. The capital requirement in Greece is relatively high at almost 1.8 billion euros or almost nine percent of existing Tier 1-capital. Despite its modest impact on the leverage on banks’ balance sheets, a regulatory obligation to finance investments in EU government bonds with some equity capital would be very welcome. The ratio of equity to total assets would improve, at least slightly, and the reform would probably loosen up the close link between bank risks and sovereign debt in the longer term. Both would help achieve a more stable financial system within Europe. Im Zuge der europäischen Schuldenkrise ist deutlich geworden, dass Staatsanleihen eine durchaus riskante Anlageform sein können. Der Basler Ausschuss und die Bundesbank haben daher eine intensive Diskussion darüber angestoßen, ob Investitionen der Banken in EU-Staatsanleihen in Zukunft mit regulatorischen Eigenkapitalanforderungen belegt werden sollten. Bisher müssen Banken hierfür kein Eigenkapital nachweisen. Würde dieses Freistellungsprivileg aufgehoben, ergibt sich für die untersuchten deutschen Banken ein zusätzlicher Kernkapitalbedarf von 3,34 Milliarden Euro. Das entspricht knapp 1,8 Prozent des vorhandenen Kernkapitals. Bei den französischen Banken beträgt der errechnete Kapitalbedarf 3,52 Milliarden Euro (gut 1,2 Prozent) und die schwedischen Banken haben einen Bedarf von zusätzlich 80,6 Millionen Euro (0,14 Prozent). Die Beschaffung der Mittel dürfte für Banken aus diesen Ländern kaum größere Probleme verursachen. Anders sieht es für die griechischen Banken aus. Der Kapitalbedarf ist hier mit knapp 1,8 Milliarden Euro zusätzlich und damit knapp neun Prozent des existierenden Kernkapitals vergleichsweise hoch. Trotz bescheidener Auswirkungen auf die Hebelung der Bankbilanzen wäre die regulatorische Verpflichtung, Investitionen in EU-Staatsanleihen auch mit Eigenkapital zu finanzieren, zu begrüßen. Das Verhältnis von Eigenmitteln zur Gesamtbilanz würde zumindest leicht verbessert und die Reform auf längere Sicht voraussichtlich die enge Verknüpfung von Bankrisiken und Staatsverschuldung lockern. Beides würde zu einem stabileren europäischen Finanzsystem beitragen.
Suggested Citation
Dorothea Schäfer & Dominik Meyland, 2015.
"Verschärfte Eigenkapitalanforderungen für EU-Staatsanleihen: ein Schritt in Richtung eines stabileren Finanzsystems,"
DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 82(20), pages 475-485.
Handle:
RePEc:diw:diwwob:82-20-1
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More about this item
Keywords
bank regulation;
bank stress test 2014;
JEL classification:
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
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