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Zehn Jahre empirische Korruptionsforschung

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  • Björn Frank

Abstract

This paper looks back on the first ten years of empirical corruption research, which started with Mauro's seminal paper in 1995. The previous theoretical discussion did not reach unanimous conclusions on whether corruption is harmful or not; the arguments are briefly sketched. International cross-sectional studies resolved the issue and provided clear evidence on negative macroeconomic and social effects of corruption. The same method has been applied in order to disentangle the causes of corruption, also suggesting or evaluating counter-measures. Results are less clear here. Finally I report on a trend towards the use of micro data sets in recent empirical corruption research. Dieser Beitrag gibt einen knappen Überblick über die ersten zehn Jahre der empirischen Korruptionsforschung, die mit Mauro (1995) begann. Die ältere theoretische Diskussion der Frage, ob Korruption schädlich ist oder nicht, hatte zu keinem eindeutigen und allgemein akzeptierten Ergebnis geführt; die wesentlichen Argumente werden kurz skizziert. Erst internationale Querschnittsstudien führten eine Klärung herbei; die negativen makroökonomischen und sozialen Auswirkungen der Korruptionsind gut belegt. Etwas weniger eindeutig sind die Ergebnisse des Versuchs, mit Länderdaten die Ursachen der Korruption - und damit die Möglichkeiten ihrer Bekämpfung - empirisch zu untersuchen. Ein neuer Trend ist die Verwendung von Mikrodatensätzen; Möglichkeiten und Wert dieses Ansatzes können in diesem Beitragnur anhand einzelner Beispiele angedeutet werden.

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  • Björn Frank, 2004. "Zehn Jahre empirische Korruptionsforschung," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(2), pages 184-199.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-20-2
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.73.2.184
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    3. Robert Neumann & Peter Graeff, 2010. "A Multitrait-Multimethod approach to pinpoint the validity of aggregated governance indicators," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 44(5), pages 849-864, August.

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