Debt Restructuring in the Euro Area: How Can Sovereign Debt Be Restructured More Effectively?
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Cited by:
- Jochen Andritzky & Désirée I. Christofzik & Lars P. Feld & Uwe Scheuering, 2019.
"A mechanism to regulate sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area,"
International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 20-34, May.
- Andritzky, Jochen & Christofzik, Désirée I. & Feld, Lars P. & Scheuering, Uwe, 2016. "A mechanism to regulate sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area," Working Papers 04/2016, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
- Andritzky, Jochen & Christofzik, Désirée I. & Feld, Lars P. & Scheuering, Uwe, 2018. "A mechanism to regulate sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 18/01, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
- Jochen Andritzky & Désirée I. Christofzik & Lars P. Feld & Uwe Scheuering, 2016. "A Mechanism to Regulate Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the Euro Area," CESifo Working Paper Series 6038, CESifo.
- van Riet, Ad, 2018. "Modern financial repression in the euro area crisis: making high public debt sustainable?," MPRA Paper 92649, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mattia Osvaldo Picarelli & Aitor Erce & Xu Jiang, 2019.
"The benefits of reducing holdout risk: evidence from the Euro CAC experiment, 2013–2018,"
Capital Markets Law Journal, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 155-177.
- Mattia Osvaldo Picarelli & Aitor Erce & Xu Jiang, 2018. "The Benefits of Reducing Hold-Out Risk: Evidence from the Euro CAC Experiment, 2013-2018," Working Papers 33, European Stability Mechanism.
- Picarelli, Mattia & Erce, Aitor, 2018. "The Benefits of Reducing Hold-Out Risk: Evidence from the Euro CAC Experiment, 2013-2018," MPRA Paper 89973, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Keywords
Sovereign debt; International financial assistance; Holdout; Coordination problem; Collective action clauses;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
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