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Consensus and majority voting in the WTO

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  • TIJMES-LHL, JAIME

Abstract

This article's subject is the implications that consensus/unanimity and majority voting might have for the World Trade Organization's (WTO) decision-making system. First it looks at some consequences that replacing the consensus rule with majority voting might have for the WTO, including justice concerns, legitimacy, homogeneity of WTO membership, and international enforcement. Second, it summarizes some solutions found in the European Union (EU) for coping with unanimity and majority rule, including constructive abstention, reallocation of contractual responsibilities, and the Luxembourg compromise. Finally, it considers some reform options for the WTO and offers some conclusions, namely expanding majority voting on certain areas only, redefining competences, multi-speed proposals (rethinking the single undertaking, constructive abstention, and the scheduling approach), redefining consensus, combining consensus and majority voting, and issuing interpretations.

Suggested Citation

  • Tijmes-Lhl, Jaime, 2009. "Consensus and majority voting in the WTO," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 417-437, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:wotrrv:v:8:y:2009:i:03:p:417-437_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Steve Charnovitz, 2010. "A Post-Montesquieu Analysis of the WTO," Working Papers 2010-3, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    2. Hoekman, Bernard M. & Mavroidis, Petros C., 2015. "Embracing Diversity: Plurilateral Agreements and the Trading System," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 101-116, January.
    3. Luke Kemp, 2015. "A climate treaty without the US Congress: Using executive powers to overcome the 'Ratification Straitjacket'," CCEP Working Papers 1513, Centre for Climate & Energy Policy, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    4. Bernard Hoekman, 2014. "Supply Chains, Mega-Regionals and Multilateralism: A Road Map for the WTO," RSCAS Working Papers 2014/27, European University Institute.
    5. Cottier, Thomas, 2011. "Confidence-Building for Global Challenges: The Experience of International Economic Law and Relations," Papers 206, World Trade Institute.
    6. Nakatomi, Michitaka, 2013. "Plurilateral Agreements: A Viable Alternative to the World Trade Organization?," ADBI Working Papers 439, Asian Development Bank Institute.
    7. Bernard Hoekman, 2014. "Sustaining multilateral trade cooperation in a multipolar world economy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 241-260, June.
    8. Kemp, Luke, 2015. "A climate treaty without the US Congress: Using executive powers to overcome the ‘Ratification Straitjacket’," Working Papers 249518, Australian National University, Centre for Climate Economics & Policy.
    9. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, 2013. "WTO 'à la carte' or WTO 'menu du jour'? Assessing the case for Plurilateral Agreements," RSCAS Working Papers 2013/58, European University Institute.

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