IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/rdepol/v5y2000i01p69-100_10.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Confidence judgments as expressions of experienced decision conflict

Author

Listed:
  • WEBER, ELKE U.
  • BÖCKENHOLT, ULF
  • HILTON, DENIS J.
  • WALLACE, BRIAN

Abstract

This study tested between two interpretations of confidence in diagnostic hypotheses: expected probability of being correct and conflict experienced during the diagnostic process. Physicians generated hypotheses for case histories with two plausible diagnoses, one having a higher population base rate but less severe clinical consequences than the other. Case information indicative of the two diagnoses was varied. Generation proportions for the two diagnoses and confidence judgments both deviated from the predictions of a Bayesian belief model, but in different ways. Generation of a hypothesis increased with diagnosis-consistent information and diagnosis base rates, but was not reduced by diagnosis-inconsistent information. Confidence was sensitive to both consistent and inconsistent information, but was not very sensitive to diagnosis base rates. Physician characteristics also affected hypothesis generation and confidence differentially. Female doctors had lower confidence in their diagnoses than male doctors, yet there were no gender differences in hypothesis generation. Experience affected hypothesis generation monotonically via the increased availability of previously diagnosed cases, while confidence first increased and then decreased with doctors' experience. The results are consistent with an interpretation of confidence judgments as an expression of decision conflict rather than an indication of likely diagnosis accuracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Weber, Elke U. & Böckenholt, Ulf & Hilton, Denis J. & Wallace, Brian, 2000. "Confidence judgments as expressions of experienced decision conflict," Risk, Decision and Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 69-100, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:rdepol:v:5:y:2000:i:01:p:69-100_10
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1357530999100073/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ilan Yaniv & Shoham Choshen-Hillel & Maxim Milyavsky, 2008. "Spurious Consensus and Opinion Revision: Why Might People Be More Confident in Their Less Accurate Judgments?," Discussion Paper Series dp492, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:rdepol:v:5:y:2000:i:01:p:69-100_10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/rdp .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.