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Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability

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  • Prato, Carlo
  • Wolton, Stephane

Abstract

The increasing cost of political campaigns and its impact on the electoral process are issues of paramount importance in modern democracies. We propose a theory of electoral accountability in which candidates choose whether or not to commit to constituency service and whether or not to pay a campaign cost to advertise their platform. A higher campaign cost decreases voter welfare when partisan imbalance is low. However, when partisan imbalance is high, a higher campaign cost is associated with a higher expected level of constituency service. More costly campaigns can thus have a rebalancing effect that improves electoral accountability. We discuss the implications of our findings for campaign finance regulation and present empirical evidence consistent with our key predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Prato, Carlo & Wolton, Stephane, 2019. "Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1-21, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:pscirm:v:7:y:2019:i:01:p:1-21_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Tinghua Yu & Elliott Ash, 2021. "Polarization and Political Selection," BCAM Working Papers 2105, Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics.
    2. Gaetan Fournier & Alberto Grillo & Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2023. "Strategic flip-flopping in political competition," Papers 2305.02834, arXiv.org.

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