IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/pscirm/v5y2017i01p31-53_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Dependency Status and Demand for Social Insurance: Evidence from Experiments and Surveys

Author

Listed:
  • Ahlquist, John S.
  • Hamman, John R.
  • Jones, Bradley M.

Abstract

Current thinking on the origins and size of the welfare state often ignores household relations in which people may depend on others for income or have dependents themselves. The influence of “dependency status” on individuals’ political preferences is unknown. We report results from a laboratory experiment designed to estimate the effect of dependency on preferences for policies that insure against labor market risk. Results indicate that (1) willingness to vote in favor of a social insurance policy is highly responsive to unemployment risk, (2) symmetric, mutual dependence is unrelated to support for insurance, but (3) asymmetric dependence (being dependent on someone else) increases support for social insurance. We connect our lab results to observational survey data and find similar relationships.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahlquist, John S. & Hamman, John R. & Jones, Bradley M., 2017. "Dependency Status and Demand for Social Insurance: Evidence from Experiments and Surveys," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 31-53, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:pscirm:v:5:y:2017:i:01:p:31-53_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S2049847015000588/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:pscirm:v:5:y:2017:i:01:p:31-53_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/ram .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.