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Exit Options and the Effectiveness of Regional Economic Organizations

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  • Gray, Julia
  • Slapin, Jonathan B.

Abstract

Regional economic organizations (REOs) proliferate in the developed and developing world. However, there is wide variation in both their institutional structure and the degree to which they achieve their goals. This article presents a theoretical framework and empirical evidence to explain the variance in the institutional design and effectiveness of these agreements. It argues that the conditions that produce effective and broad agreements are not a function of design, but rather of exogenous factors. If countries within the REO have fewer options for world trade beyond the REO, they will develop strong institutions and make substantial use of them. This study presents a new cross-regional dataset, compiled from expert surveys, to test these arguments. It shows that expert evaluations of how well a REO functions - including its ability to meet its own goals and the ambition of those goals—hinge less on that agreement's legalization and more on the trade opportunities that REO members faced when the institution was formed.

Suggested Citation

  • Gray, Julia & Slapin, Jonathan B., 2013. "Exit Options and the Effectiveness of Regional Economic Organizations," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 281-303, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:pscirm:v:1:y:2013:i:02:p:281-303_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, 2016. "Why do some international institutions contain strong dispute settlement provisions? New evidence from preferential trade agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 89-120, March.
    2. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Daniel Verdier, 2024. "To reform or to replace? Succession as a mechanism of institutional change in intergovernmental organisations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 691-719, October.

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