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Trading integrity for competence? The public's varying preferences for bureaucratic types across government levels in China

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  • Zhu, Lin
  • Yang, Feng

Abstract

People's willingness to forgive corrupt government officials has intrigued many researchers. According to a prominent explanation, citizens tolerate corrupt officials in exchange for their ability to deliver public benefits, such as promoting economic development. We contextualize this corruption–competence tradeoff thesis by assessing individuals' evaluations of local officials in China. We conduct a nationwide vignette experiment with 5527 citizens, and find that the corruption–competence tradeoff exists and is hierarchical. Respondents prefer competent but corrupt low-level officials over those who are honest but incompetent, but this relative preference vanishes when they evaluate high-level local officials. Our interviews reveal that proximity to citizens and position in the power hierarchy primarily drive citizens' sophisticated assessments of officials at different levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhu, Lin & Yang, Feng, 2023. "Trading integrity for competence? The public's varying preferences for bureaucratic types across government levels in China," Political Science Research and Methods, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(4), pages 877-892, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:pscirm:v:11:y:2023:i:4:p:877-892_12
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