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In Search of the Uncovered Set

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  • Miller, Nicholas R.

Abstract

This paper pursues a number of theoretical explorations and conjectures pertaining to the uncovered set in spatial voting games. It was stimulated by the article “The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action” by W. T. Bianco, I. Jeliazkov, and I. Sened (2004, Political Analysis 12:256—78) that employed a grid-search computational algorithm for estimating the size, shape, and location of the uncovered set, and it has been greatly facilitated by access to the CyberSenate spatial voting software being developed by Joseph Godfrey. I bring to light theoretical considerations that account for important features of the Bianco, Jeliazkov, and Sened results (e.g., the straight-line boundaries of uncovered sets displayed in some of their figures, the “unexpectedly large” uncovered sets displayed in other figures, and the apparent sensitivity of the location of uncovered sets to small shifts in the relative sizes of party caucuses) and present theoretical insights of more general relevance to spatial voting theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Miller, Nicholas R., 2007. "In Search of the Uncovered Set," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 21-45, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:polals:v:15:y:2007:i:01:p:21-45_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2022. "Generalized medians and a political center," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(2), pages 301-319, February.
    2. William T. Bianco & Christopher Kam & Itai Sened & Regina A. Smyth, 2015. "The uncovered set and its applications," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 19, pages 347-366, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Michel Le Breton & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2017. "Alliances Électorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 637-736.
    4. Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "A finite exact algorithm for epsilon-core membership in two dimensions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 178-180, November.
    5. Daniel Carroll & Jim Dolmas & Eric Young, 2021. "The Politics of Flat Taxes," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 39, pages 174-201, January.
    6. Daniel R. Carroll & Jim Dolmas & Eric Young, 2015. "Majority Voting: A Quantitative Investigation," Working Papers (Old Series) 1442, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    7. Mathieu Martin & Zéphirin Nganmeni & Craig A. Tovey, 2016. "On the uniqueness of the yolk," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(3), pages 511-518, October.
    8. Nicholas R. Miller, 2015. "The spatial model of social choice and voting," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 10, pages 163-181, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "The almost surely shrinking yolk," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 74-87, January.
    10. Adrian Deemen, 2014. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 311-330, March.
    11. Bernard GROFMAN & Joseph GODFREY, 2014. "Aspiration Models of Committee Decision Making," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2014-04-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.

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