Dynamic inefficiency by promoting relative consumption

I develop a dynamic model of consumption variety in status goods by introducing a realistic aspect that is new in the existing literature—that a good will not carry status appeal unless it is advertised. As advertisements will divert resources from new product research, growth in new products will be reduced. However, status-good advertisements also enhance distinctiveness of a good and increase a firm’s profit. This will motivate more researches. With the two effects offsetting each other, the original market bias in a standard product-development model—insufficient research due to a general knowledge spillover—cannot be overcome. While introducing advertising into models of this kind does not reverse the original welfare implication of suboptimal growth, this makes available a new and better intervention option—taxing advertisements. This tax is superior to consumption tax, the conventional solution to inefficient status competition, as consumption tax is found to be ineffective in the present model. It is also superior to research subsidies, the conventional solution to suboptimal growth, as subsidies must be financed and is not a self-sufficient policy.