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Agency control through the appointed hierarchy: presidential politicization of unilateral appointees

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  • Hollibaugh, Gary E.
  • Rothenberg, Lawrence S.

Abstract

Schedule C and noncareer Senior Executive Service positions hold significant influence over policy outcomes, yet they have received limited scrutiny compared to advise and consent (PAS) appointments. Such appointments offer understudied avenues for presidential control over the bureaucracy. Through a comprehensive analysis of more detailed data than has been employed to date, we reveal that these appointments are responsive to broader political dynamics, particularly those relevant to PAS appointments, including inter- and intrabranch conflicts, agency ideology, Senate workload, and the political calendar. However, statutory constraints and agency characteristics – such as the managerial expertise of appointed agency leadership – also shape their utilization. While unilateral appointments provide an advantage to Presidents, executives are constrained when using them to overcome legislative opposition or reshape resistant agencies. These lower-level appointments reflect the wider political landscape, granting the President significant – but not unrestrained – opportunities to exert influence on both the bureaucracy and policy outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Hollibaugh, Gary E. & Rothenberg, Lawrence S., 2024. "Agency control through the appointed hierarchy: presidential politicization of unilateral appointees," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(1), pages 44-66, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jnlpup:v:44:y:2024:i:1:p:44-66_3
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