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The electoral foundations to noncompliance: addressing the puzzle of unlawful state aid in the European Union

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  • Franchino, Fabio
  • Mainenti, Marco

Abstract

Electoral institutions shape the incentives of governments to rely on distributive measures and to comply with international obligations because of the misalignment they may engender between the collective objectives of a government party and the individual objectives of its members in the legislature. We use this argument to explain the puzzle of unlawful state aid measures in the European Union (EU). Existing theories of EU compliance and implementation offer no convincing explanation to their persistence and patterns. Using data from 2000 to 2012, we find that an increase of district magnitude improves compliance. However, compliance decreases with higher magnitude where either party leaders have no control over the ballot rank or other electoral rules strengthen the incentives to search for a personal vote. We also provide evidence for the effects of electoral reforms on compliance. These results have implications for the broader literature on compliance with international regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Franchino, Fabio & Mainenti, Marco, 2016. "The electoral foundations to noncompliance: addressing the puzzle of unlawful state aid in the European Union," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 407-436, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jnlpup:v:36:y:2016:i:03:p:407-436_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernard Steunenberg & Pieter Zwaan, 2024. "Working with the EU: How Discourses Shape the Application of EU State Aid Rules," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 242-261, January.
    2. Peter John, 2018. "Theories of policy change and variation reconsidered: a prospectus for the political economy of public policy," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 51(1), pages 1-16, March.
    3. Daniel Finke, 2020. "At loggerheads over state aid: Why the Commission rejects aid and governments comply," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(3), pages 474-496, September.
    4. Marco Schito, 2021. "A Sectoral Approach to the Politics of State Aid in the European Union: an Analysis of the European Automotive Industry," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-31, March.

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