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Explaining the Accountability of Independent Agencies: The Importance of Political Salience

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  • Koop, Christel

Abstract

Independent agencies are exempted from the accountability mechanisms inherent in the ministerial hierarchy. To compensate for this, politicians incorporate all kinds of information and reporting requirements into the statutes of the organizations. However, the degree to which this occurs varies considerably, which raises the question: Why are some agencies are made more accountable than others? This study examines the impact of political salience on degrees of accountability, controlling for other potential explanations. Using original data on 103 independent agencies in the Netherlands, the analysis demonstrates that salience has a twofold effect. First, agencies dealing with more salient issues are made more politically accountable. Second, agencies whose statutes are written when the issue of accountability is more salient are also subject to higher degrees of accountability. Other explanatory factors are the number of veto players and the legal basis of the organization.

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  • Koop, Christel, 2011. "Explaining the Accountability of Independent Agencies: The Importance of Political Salience," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(2), pages 209-234, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jnlpup:v:31:y:2011:i:02:p:209-234_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Bovens & Anchrit Wille, 2021. "Indexing watchdog accountability powers a framework for assessing the accountability capacity of independent oversight institutions," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 856-876, July.
    2. Manuel Becker & Thomas Dörfler & Thomas Gehring, 2018. "Credible commitment without independent regulatory agent: Evidence from the Security Council's United Nations Compensation Commission," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(3), pages 395-412, September.
    3. Roy Gava, 2022. "Challenging the regulators: Enforcement and appeals in financial regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1265-1282, October.
    4. Boswell, John & Cairney, Paul & St Denny, Emily, 2019. "The politics of institutionalizing preventive health," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 228(C), pages 202-210.
    5. Blom, Tannelie and Valentina Carraro, 2014. "An information processing approach to public organizations: The case of the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 18, February.
    6. Stéphane Lavertu, 2015. "For fear of popular politics? Public attention and the delegation of authority to the United States executive branch," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(2), pages 160-177, June.
    7. González, Camilo Ignacio, 2022. "Can we have it all? The evolution of regulatory frameworks in Latin America," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    8. Anthony R. Zito, 2015. "Expertise and Power: Agencies Operating in Complex Environments," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 3(1), pages 73-89.
    9. Coban, Mehmet Kerem, 2020. "Diffuse interest groups and regulatory policy change: Financial consumer protection in Turkey," OSF Preprints f6t5y, Center for Open Science.

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