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Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe

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  • HALLERBERG, MARK
  • YLÄOUTINEN, SAMI

Abstract

This paper considers the effects of fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 1998–2008. The first part makes predictions about which form of fiscal governance fits which form of government. Under multi-party coalition governments, fiscal contracts where governments make political commitments to multi-annual fiscal plans work well. In countries where two political blocks face off against one another, delegation based around a strong finance ministry should be most effective. The second part examines electoral and party systems, which affect the form of government in place. The third part documents norms, rules, and institutions in place. The final section considers the joint effects of fiscal governance on fiscal outcomes. On balance, the underlying political climate is crucial for determining what types of fiscal norms, institutions, and rules function best. The more countries diverge from their expected form of fiscal governance, the greater the increase in a country's debt burden.

Suggested Citation

  • Hallerberg, Mark & Yläoutinen, Sami, 2010. "Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 45-62, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jnlpup:v:30:y:2010:i:01:p:45-62_99
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicholas Apergis & Dan Constantin Dănuleţiu, 2013. "Public deficit, public debt, corruption and economic freedom: some empirical evidence from Romania," Romanian Economic Journal, Department of International Business and Economics from the Academy of Economic Studies Bucharest, vol. 16(48), pages 3-22, June.
    2. Benedicta Marzinotto & Guntram B. Wolff & Mark Hallerberg, 2011. "How effective and legitimate is the European semester? Increasing role of the European parliament," Working Papers 612, Bruegel.
    3. Esther Ademmer & Ferdinand Dreher, 2016. "Constraining Political Budget Cycles: Media Strength and Fiscal Institutions in the Enlarged EU," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 508-524, May.
    4. Ademmer, Esther & Dreher, Ferdinand, 2014. "Institutional constraints to political budget cycles in the enlarged EU," Kiel Working Papers 1964, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Till Cordes & Mr. Tidiane Kinda & Ms. Priscilla S Muthoora & Miss Anke Weber, 2015. "Expenditure Rules: Effective Tools for Sound Fiscal Policy?," IMF Working Papers 2015/029, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Cormier, Benjamin, 2021. "Interests over institutions: political-economic constraints on public debt management in developing countries," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112595, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Stoian, Andreea & Obreja Brasoveanu, Laura & Dumitrescu, Bogdan & Brasoveanu, Iulian, 2015. "Empirical study on the determinants of fiscal vulnerability: evidence for the European Union," MPRA Paper 65063, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Rachel A. Epstein & Wade Jacoby, 2014. "JCMS Special Issue 2014: Eastern Enlargement Ten Years On: Transcending the East-West Divide? Guest Editors: Rachel A. Epstein and Wade Jacoby," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 1-16, January.
    9. Hansen, Daniel, 2020. "The effectiveness of fiscal institutions: International financial flogging or domestic constraint?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    10. Vlaicu, Razvan & Verhoeven, Marijn & Grigoli, Francesco & Mills, Zachary, 2014. "Multiyear budgets and fiscal performance: Panel data evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 79-95.
    11. Gladys A. A. Nabieu & Godfred A. Bokpin & Achampong K. Osei & Patrick O. Asuming, 2021. "The effects of fiscal governance on fiscal performance in Sub‐Saharan Africa," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 5746-5761, October.
    12. Cezara Vinturis, 2019. "A multi-speed fiscal Europe? Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Performance in the EU Former Communist Countries," Working Papers hal-03097483, HAL.
    13. Ondrej Schneider, 2019. "Partisan Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 8014, CESifo.
    14. Martin Gorčák & Stanislav Šaroch, 2022. "Fiscal Councils In Eu Member States: Impact On Fiscal Discipline," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2022(5), pages 327-346.
    15. Alessandro Giosi & Silvia Testarmata & Sandro Brunelli & Bianca Staglianò, 2012. "Does the Quality of Public Finance Enhance Fiscal Discipline in the European Union? A Cross-Country Analysis," DSI Essays Series, DSI - Dipartimento di Studi sull'Impresa, vol. 21.
    16. Israa A. El Husseiny, 2016. "Budgetary Institutions and Fiscal Performance in Egypt: Is There a Link?," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 85-105, February.
    17. Krzysztof Beck & Michał Możdżeń, 2020. "Institutional Determinants of Budgetary Expenditures. A BMA-Based Re-Evaluation of Contemporary Theories for OECD Countries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(10), pages 1-31, May.

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