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Role of social aversion in the motivations for tax law compliance

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  • Malka Tiv, Karnit

Abstract

Discovering individuals' internal motivations for paying taxes is essential to a tax system since the basic assumption of any tax system is that most of the population pays their taxes voluntarily. This article examines the existence of a social aversion towards tax offenders in Israel as well as the variables that affect tax law compliance and increase tax payments. In this respect, the article presents quantitative questionnaire data collected by the author, which is based on a sample of 189 participants from Israel. The study shows that the social response to tax evaders exerts a greater impact on increasing tax law compliance than the fear of punishment per se and clarifies the importance of education for paying taxes.

Suggested Citation

  • Malka Tiv, Karnit, 2023. "Role of social aversion in the motivations for tax law compliance," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(5), pages 688-706, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:19:y:2023:i:5:p:688-706_8
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