IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jfinqa/v56y2021i4p1163-1191_2.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How Does Forced-CEO-Turnover Experience Affect Directors?

Author

Listed:
  • Ellis, Jesse
  • Guo, Lixiong
  • Mobbs, Shawn

Abstract

We study changes in independent director behavior and labor-market outcomes after the experience of a forced Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover. We find that independent directors are more willing to fire CEOs of underperforming firms, hire outside CEOs after a firing, and encourage better board-meeting attendance by fellow directors. We also find that the shareholders of poorly performing firms react positively when experienced directors join the board. It does come with a small cost for directors, in terms of additional directorships, although the cost is not as great as that for directors who do not fire the CEO of a poorly performing firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Ellis, Jesse & Guo, Lixiong & Mobbs, Shawn, 2021. "How Does Forced-CEO-Turnover Experience Affect Directors?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 1163-1191, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:56:y:2021:i:4:p:1163-1191_2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0022109020000307/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cook, Douglas O. & Zhang, Weiwei, 2023. "CEO performance impact on medical leave outcomes," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    2. He, Na & Yang, Junjie & Ren, Jiahui, 2024. "Pollution and green innovation: Evidence from CEOs’ early-life experience," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(PA), pages 65-79.
    3. Li, Siyuan & Qu, Tianshu Charlotte & Yu, Yingri Julia, 2022. "Outside director social network centrality and turnover before stock performance crash: A friend in need?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    4. Chen, Chen & Dou, Ying & Kuang, Yu Flora & Naiker, Vic, 2023. "Do professional ties enhance board seat prospects of independent directors with tainted reputations?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:56:y:2021:i:4:p:1163-1191_2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/jfq .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.