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Insider Trading: What Really Protects U.S. Investors?

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  • White, Roger M.

Abstract

I examine the ability of the U.S. investor protection regime to limit insider trading returns, absent Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the short-swing rule). I find that in this setting, U.S. insiders execute short-swing trades that i) beat the market by approximately 15 basis points per day and ii) systematically divest ahead of disappointing earnings announcements. These results indicate that the bright-line rule restricting short-horizon round-trip insider trading plays a substantial role in protecting outside investors from privately informed insiders in the United States.

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  • White, Roger M., 2020. "Insider Trading: What Really Protects U.S. Investors?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 1305-1332, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:55:y:2020:i:4:p:1305-1332_8
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    Cited by:

    1. Sanggyu Kang & Chune Young Chung & Amirhossein Fard, 2024. "Does geographic or market proximity matter? Evidence from institutional investor monitoring on earnings attributes in US cross‐listed stocks," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(2), pages 443-469, April.
    2. Mengqin Zhang & Yi He & Surui Zhang & Xiang Zhang & Stavros Sindakis & Saloome Showkat, 2024. "Stock Liquidity and Investment Efficiency: Evidence from the New Regulation of Insider Selling in China," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 15(2), pages 8563-8587, June.
    3. Lee, Dongyeol & Kim, Woo Chang, 2021. "Cost of shareholder engagement by institutional investors under short-swing profit rule," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).

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