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Do Short Sellers Trade on Private Information or False Information?

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  • Purnanandam, Amiyatosh
  • Seyhun, H. Nejat

Abstract

We investigate whether short sellers contribute toward the informational efficiency of market prices by trading on their private information or destabilize market prices by trading on rumors and false information. We find that short-selling activities are considerably informative about future stock returns when there is a higher likelihood of private information in stocks, as measured by insider-trading activities. Short sellers also bring considerable additional information to the market that is not fully captured by contemporaneous insider trading. Overall, these results suggest that on average, short sellers bring informational efficiency to market prices rather than destabilize them.

Suggested Citation

  • Purnanandam, Amiyatosh & Seyhun, H. Nejat, 2018. "Do Short Sellers Trade on Private Information or False Information?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 997-1023, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:53:y:2018:i:03:p:997-1023_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Merl, Robert & Stöckl, Thomas & Palan, Stefan, 2023. "Insider trading regulation and shorting constraints. Evaluating the joint effects of two market interventions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    2. Chague, Fernando & De-Losso, Rodrigo & Giovannetti, Bruno, 2019. "The short-selling skill of institutions and individuals," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 77-91.
    3. Dai, Rui & Ng, Lilian & Zaiats, Nataliya, 2022. "Short seller attention," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    4. Haiyan Jiang & Gary Tian & Donghua Zhou, 2021. "The influence of the deregulation of short‐selling on related‐party transactions: Evidence from China," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(5-6), pages 1022-1056, May.
    5. Chen, Shenglan & Chou, Robin K. & Liu, Xiaoling & Wu, Yuhui, 2020. "Deregulation of short-selling constraints and cost of bank loans: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    6. Khorram, Mehdi & Mo, Haitao & Sanger, Gary C., 2023. "Information flow and credit rating announcements," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    7. repec:grz:wpsses:2021-03 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Gilstrap, Collin & Petkevich, Alex & Teterin, Pavel, 2020. "Striking up with the in crowd: When option markets and insiders agree," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    9. Luu, Ellie & Xu, Fangming & Zheng, Liyi, 2023. "Short-selling activities in the time of COVID-19," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(4).
    10. Connelly, Brian L. & Shi, Wei & Cheng, Xin & Yin, Cheng, 2021. "Short Sellers: A screening theory perspective on B2B relationships," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 393-404.
    11. Millicent Chang & John Gould & Yuyun Huang & Sirimon Treepongkaruna & Joey Wenling Yang, 2022. "Insider trading and the algorithmic trading environment," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 22(4), pages 725-750, December.
    12. Betton, Sandra & Davis, Frederick & Walker, Thomas, 2018. "Rumor rationales: The impact of message justification on article credibility," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 271-287.

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