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Once Burned, Twice Shy: Money Market Fund Responses to a Systemic Liquidity Shock

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  • Strahan, Philip E.
  • Tanyeri, Başak

Abstract

After Lehman’s collapse in 2008, investors ran from risky money market funds. In 27 funds, outflows overwhelmed cash inflows, thus forcing asset sales. These funds sold their safest and most liquid holdings. Funds were thus left with riskier and longer maturity assets. Over the subsequent quarter, however, the hard-hit funds reduced risk more than other funds. In contrast, money funds hit by idiosyncratic liquidity shocks before Lehman did not alter portfolio risk. The result suggests that moral hazard concerns with the Treasury Guarantee of investor claims did not increase risk taking. Funds that benefited most from the government bailout reduced risk.

Suggested Citation

  • Strahan, Philip E. & Tanyeri, Başak, 2015. "Once Burned, Twice Shy: Money Market Fund Responses to a Systemic Liquidity Shock," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(1-2), pages 119-144, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:50:y:2015:i:1-2:p:119-144_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Kim, Hugh Hoikwang, 2020. "Information spillover of bailouts," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).
    2. Antoine Bouveret & Antoine Martin & Patrick E. McCabe, 2022. "Money Market Fund Vulnerabilities: A Global Perspective," Staff Reports 1009, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    3. Mark Egan & Ali Hortaçsu & Gregor Matvos, 2017. "Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the US Banking Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(1), pages 169-216, January.
    4. Fernando Avalos & Dora Xia, 2021. "Investor size, liquidity and prime money market fund stress," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, March.
    5. Capotă, Laura-Dona & Grill, Michael & Molestina Vivar, Luis & Schmitz, Niklas & Weistroffer, Christian, 2022. "Is the EU money market fund regulation fit for purpose? Lessons from the COVID-19 turmoil," Working Paper Series 2737, European Central Bank.
    6. Li, Yi, 2021. "Reciprocal lending relationships in shadow banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(2), pages 600-619.
    7. Chen, Qi & Goldstein, Itay & Huang, Zeqiong & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2022. "Bank transparency and deposit flows," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 475-501.
    8. Branzoli, Nicola & Gallo, Raffaele & Ilari, Antonio & Portioli, Dario, 2024. "Central banks’ corporate asset purchase programmes and risk-taking by bond funds in the aftermath of market stress," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    9. Allen, Kyle D. & Winters, Drew B., 2020. "Crisis regulations: The unexpected consequences of floating NAV for money market funds," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    10. Fernando M. Linardi, 2020. "Investors’ Behavior and Mutual Fund Portfolio Allocations in Brazil during the Global Financial Crisis," Working Papers Series 517, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    11. Abbas Hejri, 2022. "On the recent developments of mutual funds with fixed‐income holdings: a systematic review," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(2), pages 2313-2338, June.
    12. La Spada, Gabriele, 2018. "Competition, reach for yield, and money market funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 87-110.
    13. Matthias Fleckenstein & Francis A. Longstaff, 2018. "Floating Rate Money? The Stability Premium in Treasury Floating Rate Notes," NBER Working Papers 25216, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Di Maggio, Marco & Kacperczyk, Marcin, 2017. "The unintended consequences of the zero lower bound policy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 59-80.
    15. Linardi, Fernando M., 2020. "Investors’ behavior and mutual fund portfolio allocations in Brazil during the global financial crisis," Latin American Journal of Central Banking (previously Monetaria), Elsevier, vol. 1(1).
    16. Timmermann, Allan & Schmidt, Lawrence & , & Wermers, Russ, 2017. "Transparency, Investor Information Acquisition, and Money Market Fund Risk Rebalancing during the 2011-12 Eurozone Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 11895, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Qian, Meijun & Tanyeri, Başak, 2017. "Litigation and mutual-fund runs," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 119-135.
    18. Huber, Amy Wang, 2023. "Market power in wholesale funding: A structural perspective from the triparty repo market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 149(2), pages 235-259.
    19. Günsür, Başak Tanyeri & Bulut, Emre, 2022. "Investor reactions to major events in the sub-prime mortgage crisis," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB).
    20. Allen, Kyle & Saha, Pritam & Whitledge, Matthew & Winters, Drew, 2023. "Money market reforms:The effect on the commercial paper market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    21. Chiu, Junmao & Tsai, Kunchi, 2017. "Government interventions and equity liquidity in the sub-prime crisis period: Evidence from the ETF market," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 128-142.
    22. Nicola Branzoli & Raffaele Gallo & Antonio Ilari & Dario Portioli, 2023. "Financial fragilities and risk-taking of corporate bond funds in the aftermath of central bank policy interventions," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1404, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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