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Corporate Governance and Risk Taking in Pension Plans: Evidence from Defined Benefit Asset Allocations

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  • Phan, Hieu V.
  • Hegde, Shantaram P.

Abstract

Based on theoretical advice and empirical evidence suggesting that risk taking in asset allocation enhances pension returns, we evaluate empirically whether good corporate governance leads to a larger allocation of pension assets to risky securities as compared to safe investments. Our findings suggest that firms with good external and internal corporate governance take more risk by investing heavily in equities and allocating a smaller share of the plan assets to cash, government debt, and insurance company accounts. The main underlying mechanisms appear to be higher investment returns and better pension funding status associated with higher equity and lower safe asset allocations.

Suggested Citation

  • Phan, Hieu V. & Hegde, Shantaram P., 2013. "Corporate Governance and Risk Taking in Pension Plans: Evidence from Defined Benefit Asset Allocations," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 919-946, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:48:y:2013:i:03:p:919-946_00
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    Cited by:

    1. He, Feng & Ding, Cong & Yue, Wei & Liu, Guanchun, 2023. "ESG performance and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    2. Guan, Yanling & Tang, Dragon Yongjun, 2018. "Employees' risk attitude and corporate risk taking: Evidence from pension asset allocations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 261-274.
    3. Goto, Shingo & Yanase, Noriyoshi, 2023. "Corporate governance and shareholder-employee risk-shifting: Evidence from corporate pension plan sponsors," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(PA).
    4. Hegde, Shantaram P. & Mishra, Dev R., 2017. "Strategic risk-taking and value creation: Evidence from the market for corporate control," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 212-234.
    5. Anantharaman, Divya & Lee, Yong Gyu, 2014. "Managerial risk taking incentives and corporate pension policy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 328-351.
    6. Boon, L.N. & Brière, M. & Rigot, S., 2018. "Regulation and pension fund risk-taking," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 23-41.
    7. Goto, Shingo & Yanase, Noriyoshi, 2021. "Pension return assumptions and shareholder-employee risk-shifting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    8. Rob Bauer & Matteo Bonneti & Dirk Broeders, 2018. "Pension Funds Interconnections and Herd Behavior," DNB Working Papers 612, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    9. Hasa, Sidita & Salva, Carolina, 2024. "Cash holdings in pension funds," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    10. Berchtold, Demian & Dichter, Oliver & Loderer, Claudio & Waelchli, Urs, 2021. "Pension risk and corporate investment distortion," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    11. Bryan, David B., 2017. "Organized labor, audit quality, and internal control," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 11-26.

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