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Stock Option Repricing and Its Alternatives: An Empirical Examination

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  • Kalpathy, Swaminathan

Abstract

In this paper I examine the likelihood of CEO stock option repricing and its alternatives: namely, option grant, stock grant, and “do nothing.” Multinomial logit results suggest that firms reprice options to increase sensitivity of pay to stock price and to temper down sensitivity of pay to volatility. Moreover, repricing firms are younger and more concentrated in industries where human capital is important. Finally, I find no evidence that internal governance or executive conflicts of interest are relevant in explaining repricing. My results indicate that repricing is motivated by incentive alignment and retention, and not by agency cost considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • Kalpathy, Swaminathan, 2009. "Stock Option Repricing and Its Alternatives: An Empirical Examination," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(6), pages 1459-1487, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:44:y:2009:i:06:p:1459-1487_99
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    Cited by:

    1. Kam C. Chan & Tao Chen & Baohua Liu & Junfeng Wu, 2022. "Air pollution and CEO compensation: Evidence from China," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(2), pages 448-469, April.
    2. Yang, Zhenyi & Leng, Tiecheng & Pan, Luyao & Wang, Xiaoming, 2022. "Paying for pollution: Air quality and executive compensation," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    3. Gulen, Huseyin & O'Brien, William J., 2017. "Option repricing, corporate governance, and the effect of shareholder empowerment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 389-415.
    4. Gao, Huasheng & Harford, Jarrad & Li, Kai, 2012. "CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 291-310.
    5. Gande, Amar & Kalpathy, Swaminathan, 2017. "CEO compensation and risk-taking at financial firms: Evidence from U.S. federal loan assistance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 131-150.
    6. Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, 2017. "Do Stock Options Overcome Managerial Risk Aversion? Evidence from Exercises of Executive Stock Options," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(9), pages 3057-3071, September.
    7. Chakraborty, Indraneel & Gantchev, Nickolay, 2013. "Does shareholder coordination matter? Evidence from private placements," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 213-230.
    8. Goergen, Marc & Renneboog, Luc, 2011. "Managerial compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1068-1077, September.

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