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U. S. Investors' Perceptions of Corporate Control in Mexico: Evidence from Sibling ADRs

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  • Pinegar, J. Michael
  • Ravichandran, R.

Abstract

We examine the relative prices of sibling American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). These ADRs are issued against classes of shares with different voting rights that are issued by the same foreign firm. Though superior and inferior voting siblings begin trading in the U. S. at nearly equal values, prices quickly separate. For non-Mexican issues, superior voting ADRs command a premium. For Mexican issues, superior voting shares trade at a discount. The Mexican discount is inconsistent with the benefits of U. S. listing discussed in other recent studies and cannot be explained by differences in cash flow rights, systematic risk, liquidity, voting control of major blockholders, or ownership restrictions. Our analysis suggests, however, that control for our Mexican firms has shifted to creditors and competitors, thus, eroding equity voting premiums.

Suggested Citation

  • Pinegar, J. Michael & Ravichandran, R., 2003. "U. S. Investors' Perceptions of Corporate Control in Mexico: Evidence from Sibling ADRs," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 213-230, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:38:y:2003:i:01:p:213-230_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Wölfle, Marco, 2007. "Price Discovery for Cross-Listed Securities from Emerging Eastern European Countries," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-067, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Imen Ghadhab, 2023. "Bonding, signaling theory and dividend policy: Evidence from multinational firms," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 24(1), pages 69-83, February.
    3. Nebosja Dimic & Vitaly Orlov, 2018. "Internationalization and firm valuation: New evidence from first offshore bond issuances of US firms," Working Papers on Finance 1803, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
    4. Pak Hung Au & Yuk‐Fai Fong & Jin Li, 2020. "Negotiated Block Trade And Rebuilding Of Trust," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(2), pages 901-939, May.
    5. Gozzi, Juan Carlos & Levine, Ross & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2008. "Internationalization and the evolution of corporate valuation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 607-632, June.
    6. Karolyi, G. Andrew, 2012. "Corporate governance, agency problems and international cross-listings: A defense of the bonding hypothesis," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 516-547.
    7. Dimic, Nebojsa & Orlov, Vitaly & Piljak, Vanja, 2022. "First offshore bond issuances and firm valuation," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    8. Ormazabal, Gaizka, 2018. "The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: A View from Accounting Research," CEPR Discussion Papers 12775, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Ghadhab, Imen, 2021. "Cross-listing and the alignment between short and long-run performance," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    10. Brau, James C. & Rodríguez, Javier, 2009. "An empirical analysis of Mexican and US closed-end mutual fund IPOs," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-17, January.
    11. Vikas Mehrotra & Randall Morck, 2017. "Governance and Stakeholders," NBER Working Papers 23460, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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