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Corporate Hedging and Speculative Incentives: Implications for Swap Market Default Risk

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  • Mozumdar, Abon

Abstract

This paper demonstrates a tradeoff between the risk-shifting and hedging incentives of firms and identifies conditions under which each dominates. A firm may have the incentive to hedge in a multi-period context, even if no such incentive exists in a single-period one. Unrestricted access to swaps in the presence of asymmetric information about firm type and the swapping motive would lead to unbounded speculation resulting in breakdowns in swap and debt markets. Price-based methods are unable to control this and market makers have to rely upon additional exposure information or credit enhancement devices to preserve equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Mozumdar, Abon, 2001. "Corporate Hedging and Speculative Incentives: Implications for Swap Market Default Risk," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(2), pages 221-250, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:36:y:2001:i:02:p:221-250_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Nguyen, Hoa & Faff, Robert, 2006. "Foreign debt and financial hedging: Evidence from Australia," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 184-201.
    2. Jyh-Horng Lin & Min-Li Yi, 2005. "Loan Portfolio Swaps and Optimal Lending," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 177-198, January.
    3. Levent Güntay & N. R. Prabhala & Haluk Unal, "undated". "Callable Bonds and Hedging," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 02-13, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    4. Purnanandam, Amiyatosh, 2008. "Financial distress and corporate risk management: Theory and evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3), pages 706-739, March.
    5. Bauer, Wolfgang & Ryser, Marc, 2004. "Risk management strategies for banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 331-352, February.

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