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The Effect of Adoption of Long-Term Performance Plans on Stock Prices and Accounting Numbers

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  • Kumar, Raman
  • Sopariwala, Parvez R.

Abstract

Long-term performance plans are theoretically adopted to better align the interests of the managers and stockholders by redirecting managerial decision-making toward the longterm performance of the corporation. This study reports significant positive excess returns around the announcement of performance plan adoption, which is consistent with the view that such plans would reduce the agency problem. In addition, this study finds an association between the adoption of long-term performance plans and subsequent growth in profitability, suggesting that long-term performance plans may have been successful in motivating an enhancement in the accounting measures of profitability used to reward managers under the plan. Finally, the excess returns around the announcement of performance plan adoption are found to be positively correlated with subsequent change in growth of earnings per share, the most commonly used accounting performance measure.

Suggested Citation

  • Kumar, Raman & Sopariwala, Parvez R., 1992. "The Effect of Adoption of Long-Term Performance Plans on Stock Prices and Accounting Numbers," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(4), pages 561-573, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:27:y:1992:i:04:p:561-573_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
    2. Ferris, Stephen P. & Kumar, Raman & Sant, Rajiv & Sopariwala, Parvez R., 1998. "An agency analysis of the effect of long-term performance plans on managerial decision making," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 73-91.
    3. Ni, Yensen & Huang, Paoyu & Chen, Yuhsin, 2019. "Board structure, considerable capital, and stock price overreaction informativeness in terms of technical indicators," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 514-528.
    4. Pierre Chaigneau, 2010. "The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation," FMG Discussion Papers dp660, Financial Markets Group.
    5. Chowdhury, Jaideep & Sahaym, Arvin & Raina, Gurdeep Singh, 2023. "When is the board’s two cents worth more? The relationship between board of directors’ pay and firm performance under contingencies," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    6. Zunaidah Sulong & John C. Gardner & Amariah Hanum Hussin & Zuraidah Mohd Sanusi & Carl B. McGowan, Jr., 2013. "Managerial Ownership, Leverage And Audit Quality Impact On Firm Performance: Evidence From The Malaysian Ace Market," Accounting & Taxation, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 5(1), pages 59-70.
    7. de Jong, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Mertens, G.M.H. & Wasley, C., 2000. "The Role of Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance : Evidence from the Netherlands," Discussion Paper 2000-59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Eli Talmor & James S. Wallace, 1998. "Computer Industry Executives: An Analysis of the New Barons' Compensation," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 9(4), pages 398-414, December.
    9. Brooks, Raymond M. & May, Don O. & Mishra, Chandra S., 2001. "The performance of firms before and after they adopt accounting-based performance plans," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 205-222.
    10. Rainer Niemann & Dirk Simons, 2002. "Costs, Benefits, and Tax-induced Distortions of Stock Option Plans," CESifo Working Paper Series 815, CESifo.
    11. Charlie Weir, 1997. "Corporate governance, performance and take-overs: an empirical analysis of UK mergers," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(11), pages 1465-1475.
    12. Vitkova, Valeriya & Tian, Siyang & Sudarsanam, Sudi, 2023. "Allocative efficiency of internal capital markets: Evidence from equity carve-outs by diversified firms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    13. Samer Khalil & Michel Magnan & Paul André, 2008. "The Adoption of Deferred Share Unit Plans for Outside Directors and Shareholder Wealth," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 210-224, May.
    14. de Jong, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Mertens, G.M.H. & Wasley, C., 2000. "The Role of Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance : Evidence from the Netherlands," Other publications TiSEM 6d35b4ae-d3a9-4977-8321-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Ferris, Stephen P. & Sen, Nilanjan & Lim, Chee Yeow & Yeo, Gillian H. H., 2002. "Corporate focus versus diversification: the role of growth opportunities and cashflow," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 231-252, July.
    16. Ampofo, Akwasi A. & Barkhi, Reza, 2024. "The impact of CEO power and ethical corporate citizenship on firms’ outcomes," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(PA).

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