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Asymmetric Information, Collateral, and Moral Hazard

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  • Igawa, Kazuhiro
  • Kanatas, George

Abstract

In a credit market characterized by a priori asymmetric information, collateral not only can identify credit applicants but also can result in moral hazard involving the borrower's use of pledged assets. The borrower's other alternatives are to apply for unsecured bank credit and be priced as “average,” or to acquire financing by selling an asset and subsequently renting it for continued use. The optimal secured loan contract for higher quality firms is shown to involve overcollateralization. There is underinvestment relative to first best in maintenance of the pledged assets but overinvestment relative to the level that would be chosen without bank monitoring. Self-financing and unsecured credit are chosen by the intermediate and lowest quality groups, respectively.

Suggested Citation

  • Igawa, Kazuhiro & Kanatas, George, 1990. "Asymmetric Information, Collateral, and Moral Hazard," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(4), pages 469-490, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:25:y:1990:i:04:p:469-490_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alex Petkevich & Andrew Prevost, 2018. "Managerial ability, information quality, and the design and pricing of corporate debt," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1033-1069, November.
    2. Niinimäki, J.-P., 2011. "Nominal and true cost of loan collateral," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 2782-2790, October.
    3. Annamaria Menichini & Maria Grazia Romano, 2018. "Does the Master’s Eye Fatten the Cattle? Maintenance and Care of Collateral under Purchase and Leasing Contracts," CSEF Working Papers 520, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 15 Mar 2021.
    4. Gallurt, Jesus & Pombo, Pablo & Ramirez, Jesus & Molina, Horacio, 2012. "La asimetria de la informacion en la crisis financiera, el racionamiento del credito y la garantia como mecanismo simbiotico del sistema [The information asymmetry in the financial crisis, credit r," MPRA Paper 39773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Shu Hui Lan & Jia Yi Cheng & Sheng Guo, 2016. "How to Build up the Loan - Evaluation System toward Small and Medium Enterprises between Taiwan and China’s Commercial Banks？ The Application for Multi Criteria Decision Making," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 9(3), pages 121-142, March.
    6. Kraus, Daniel, 2010. "When do we have borrower or credit volume rationing in competitive credit market with imperfect information?," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 117, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    7. Shao-Chi Chang & Sheng-Syan Chen & Ailing Hsing & Chia Huang, 2007. "Investment opportunities, free cash flow, and stock valuation effects of secured debt offerings," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 123-145, February.
    8. Artashes Karapetyan & Bogdan Stacescu, 2012. "Collateral and repeated lending," Working Paper 2012/18, Norges Bank.
    9. Meles, Antonio & Porzio, Claudio & Sampagnaro, Gabriele & Starita, Maria Grazia & Verdoliva, Vincenzo, 2017. "Collateralization of business loans: Testing the prediction of theories," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 922-938.
    10. Latino, Carmelo & Pelizzon, Loriana & Riedel, Max, 2023. "How to green the European Auto ABS market? A literature survey," SAFE Working Paper Series 391, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    11. Majumdar, Raju, 2012. "The role of secured debt in resolving agency conflicts and problems of asymmetric information: Indian evidence," MPRA Paper 37925, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. John S. Gonas & Michael J. Highfield & Donald J. Mullineaux, 2004. "When Are Commercial Loans Secured?," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 39(1), pages 79-99, February.
    13. Majumdar, Raju, 2012. "The Determinants of Indebtedness in Unlisted Manufacturing Firms in India: A Panel Data Analysis," MPRA Paper 43427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Bellucci, Andrea & Borisov, Alexander & Giombini, Germana & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2019. "Collateralization and distance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 205-217.
    15. Wendy Edelberg, 2004. "Testing for adverse selection and moral hazard in consumer loan markets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-09, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    16. Ioannidou, Vasso & Pavanini, Nicola & Peng, Yushi, 2022. "Collateral and asymmetric information in lending markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 93-121.
    17. Lucia Dunn & Shubhasis Dey, 2004. "An Empirical Investigation of Collateral and Sorting in the HELOC Market," Working Papers 04-07, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.

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