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Why Are Modern Bureaucracies Special? State Support to Private Firms in Early Eighteenth-Century France

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  • Beuve, Jean
  • Brousseau, Eric
  • Sgard, Jérôme

Abstract

The Bureau du Commerce allocated rights and rents to private entrepreneurs via a mix of hierarchical division of labor and peer-based collegial deliberation. This set-up reflected an attempt to maximize information and expertise, but also allowed for the recognition of private rights and social interests. The final decisions of the Bureau (for or against each demand), and the qualitative arguments brought forward during the procedure, are robust predictors of eventual decisions. We see this result as an indication that impersonal, rational and informed decision-making could be obtained even within a patrimonialist, rent-seeking State.

Suggested Citation

  • Beuve, Jean & Brousseau, Eric & Sgard, Jérôme, 2017. "Why Are Modern Bureaucracies Special? State Support to Private Firms in Early Eighteenth-Century France," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(4), pages 1144-1176, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:77:y:2017:i:04:p:1144-1176_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert B. Ekelund & Mark Thornton, 2020. "Rent seeking as an evolving process: the case of the Ancien Régime," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 139-155, January.
    2. Alves, Amanda M. & Brousseau, Eric & Yeung, Timothy Yu-Cheong, 2021. "The dynamics of institution building: State aids, the European commission, and the court of justice of the European Union," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 836-859.

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