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The Check is in the Mail: Correspondent Clearing and the Collapse of the Banking System, 1930 to 1933

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  • Richardson, Gary

Abstract

Weaknesses within the check-clearing system played a hitherto unrecognized role in the banking crises of the Great Depression. Correspondent check-clearing networks were vulnerable to counter-party cascades. Accounting conventions that overstated reserves available to corresponding institutions may have exacerbated the situation. The initial banking panic began when a correspondent network centered in Nashville collapsed, forcing over 100 institutions to suspend operations. As the contraction continued, additional correspondent systems imploded. The vulnerability of correspondent networks is one reason that banks that cleared via correspondents failed at higher rates than other institutions during the Great Depression.

Suggested Citation

  • Richardson, Gary, 2007. "The Check is in the Mail: Correspondent Clearing and the Collapse of the Banking System, 1930 to 1933," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 643-671, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:67:y:2007:i:03:p:643-671_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Billings & Forrest Capie, 2011. "Financial crisis, contagion, and the British banking system between the world wars," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(2), pages 193-215.
    2. Mitchener, Kris & Richardson, Gary, 2020. "Contagion of Fear," CEPR Discussion Papers 14510, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Kris James Mitchener & Gary Richardson, 2019. "Network Contagion and Interbank Amplification during the Great Depression," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(2), pages 465-507.
    4. Kris J. Mitchener & Angela Vossmeyer & Kris James Mitchener, 2023. "How Do Financial Crises Redistribute Risk?," CESifo Working Paper Series 10597, CESifo.
    5. Haelim Anderson & Gary Richardson & Brian Yang, 2023. "Deposit Insurance and Depositor Monitoring: Quasi‐Experimental Evidence from the Creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(2-3), pages 441-464, March.
    6. Christopher Hoag, 2015. "Clearinghouse Loan Certificates as Interbank Loans," Working Papers 1504, Trinity College, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2015.
    7. Juan Felipe Espinosa-Cristia & José Ignacio Alarcón & Bernardo Batiz-Lazo, 2022. "Local Adaptation of Work Practices: The Case of BancoEstado’s “CajaVecina†Correspondent Banking System," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(2), pages 21582440221, April.
    8. Haelim Anderson & Mark Paddrik & Jessie Jiaxu Wang, 2019. "Bank Networks and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the National Banking Acts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(9), pages 3125-3161, September.
    9. Louis-Philippe Rochon & Sergio Rossi, 2011. "Monetary Policy Without Reserve Requirements: Central Bank Money as Means of Final Payment on the Interbank Market," Chapters, in: Claude Gnos & Louis-Philippe Rochon (ed.), Credit, Money and Macroeconomic Policy, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Francesca Carapella, 2015. "Banking panics and deflation in dynamic general equilibrium," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-18, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Jaremski, Matthew & Mathy, Gabrial, 2017. "Looking Back On the Age of Checking in America, 1800-1960," MPRA Paper 78083, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Sanjiv R. Das & Kris James Mitchener & Angela Vossmeyer, 2022. "Bank Regulation, Network Topology, and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the Great Depression," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(5), pages 1261-1312, August.

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