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Did Glass-Steagall Increase the Cost of External Finance for Corporate Investment?: Evidence From Bank and Insurance Company Affiliations

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  • Ramírez, Carlos D.

Abstract

The Glass-Steagall Act may have increased the cost for corporations of raising external funds for investment spending. Significant differences are found in the way financial institutions influenced corporate investment spending. Investment regressions for a sample of companies affiliated to financial institutions are estimated and compared to those for a control sample. Prior to Glass-Steagall, affiliated companies do not display any sensitivity between investment spending and internal measures of liquidity, whereas the control sample does.

Suggested Citation

  • Ramírez, Carlos D., 1999. "Did Glass-Steagall Increase the Cost of External Finance for Corporate Investment?: Evidence From Bank and Insurance Company Affiliations," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(2), pages 372-396, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:59:y:1999:i:02:p:372-396_02
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    Cited by:

    1. Barry Eichengreen, 2011. "Out-of-the-Box Thoughts about the International Financial Architecture," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 13, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Maxime Delabarre, 2020. "Could the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act have prevented the financial crisis?," Working Papers hal-03014511, HAL.
    3. Neal, Larry & White, Eugene N., 2012. "The Glass–Steagall Act in historical perspective," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 104-113.
    4. Maxime Delabarre, 2020. "Could the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act have prevented the financial crisis?," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03014511, HAL.
    5. Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, 2014. "Interest Groups and the Glass-Steagall Act," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(4), pages 14-18, 01.
    6. repec:ces:ifodic:v:11:y:2014:i:4:p:19105950 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, 2014. "Interest Groups and the Glass-Steagall Act," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(04), pages 14-18, January.
    8. Christopher L. Colvin, 2014. "Interlocking directorates and conflicts of interest: the Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging, M�ller & Co. and the Dutch financial crisis of the 1920s," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(2), pages 314-334, March.

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