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Mass Production Conquers the Pool: Firm Organization and the Nature of Competition in the Nineteenth Century

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  • Levenstein, Margaret

Abstract

This article uses the records of the Dow Chemical Company to analyze the role of distributors in facilitating collusion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It compares collusion in three closely related markets: salt, bromine, and bleach. Where national distributors with well-established reputations had facilitated the entry of small producers into integrated markets, distributors could also facilitate collusion. Mass-producing entrants, like Dow, joined collusive distribution arrangements while improving their innovative production processes. In the longer run, they integrated forward to escape the output restrictions and arms-length relationship with customers imposed by collusive agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Levenstein, Margaret, 1995. "Mass Production Conquers the Pool: Firm Organization and the Nature of Competition in the Nineteenth Century," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(3), pages 575-611, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:55:y:1995:i:03:p:575-611_04
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    Cited by:

    1. Gavin Wright, 1999. "Can a Nation Learn? American Technology as a Network Phenomenon," NBER Chapters, in: Learning by Doing in Markets, Firms, and Countries, pages 295-332, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. John M. Connor, 2003. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement," Working Papers 03-12, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    3. George Deltas & Richard Sicotte, 2017. "Cartel Organization, Price Discrimination, and Selection of Transatlantic Migrants: 1899–1911," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(3), pages 668-704, January.
    4. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2014. "How Do Cartels Use Vertical Restraints? Reflections on Bork's The Antitrust Paradox," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(S3), pages 33-50.
    5. Panayiotis Agisilaou, 2013. "Collusion in Industrial Economics and Optimally Designed Leniency Programmes - A Survey," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2013-03, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    6. de Roos, Nicolas, 2004. "A model of collusion timing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 351-387, March.

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