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Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: the United States, 1789–1910

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  • Scheiber, Harry N.

Abstract

Expropriation of private property by government is seldom found on the list of policies which have influenced the course of economic development in American history. To be sure, the once-vigorous myth of antebellum laisser-faire has been discarded; and it is no longer taken as a startling proposition that governmental interventions to promote and regulate the economy occurred regularly throughout the nineteenth century. But for two reasons, I think, expropriation as an instrument of conscious resource allocation has failed to receive from historians the attention it deserves.

Suggested Citation

  • Scheiber, Harry N., 1973. "Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: the United States, 1789–1910," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 232-251, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:33:y:1973:i:01:p:232-251_07
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    Cited by:

    1. Fischel, William A., 1995. "The offer/ask disparity and just compensation for takings: A constitutional choice perspective," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 187-203, June.
    2. Fleck, Robert K. & Hanssen, F. Andrew, 2024. "Courts, legislatures, and evolving property rules: Lessons from eminent domain," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    3. Besley, Timothy & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2010. "Property Rights and Economic Development," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Dani Rodrik & Mark Rosenzweig (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 4525-4595, Elsevier.
    4. Kanazawa, Mark, 2023. "Politics and eminent domain: Evidence from the 1879 California constitution," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    5. José Manuel Palma‐Oliveira & Benjamin D. Trump & Matthew D. Wood & Igor Linkov, 2018. "Community‐Driven Hypothesis Testing: A Solution for the Tragedy of the Anticommons," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(3), pages 620-634, March.
    6. Geoffrey Turnbull, 2012. "Delegating Eminent Domain Powers to Private Firms: Land Use and Efficiency Implications," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 305-325, August.
    7. Van Noort, S., 2017. "Causes and Effects of Private Property Rights Security," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1746, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    8. Fleck, Robert K. & Hanssen, F. Andrew, 2010. "Repeated adjustment of delegated powers and the history of eminent domain," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 99-112, June.

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