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Who Gets to Be In the Room? Manipulating Participation in WTO Disputes

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  • Johns, Leslie
  • Pelc, Krzysztof J.

Abstract

Third parties complicate World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement by adding voices and issues to a dispute. However, complainants can limit third parties by filing cases under Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), rather than Article XXII. We argue that third parties create “insurance” by lowering the benefit of winning and the cost of losing a dispute. We construct a formal model in which third parties make settlement less likely. The weaker the complainant's case, the more likely the complainant is to promote third party participation and to settle. Article XXII cases are therefore more likely to settle, controlling for the realized number of third parties, and a complainant who files under Article XXIII is more likely to win a ruling and less likely to see that ruling appealed by the defendant. We provide empirical support using WTO disputes from 1995 to 2011.

Suggested Citation

  • Johns, Leslie & Pelc, Krzysztof J., 2014. "Who Gets to Be In the Room? Manipulating Participation in WTO Disputes," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 663-699, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:68:y:2014:i:03:p:663-699_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Hyo Won Lee, 2019. "Legalization and dispute settlement benefits: The case of the GATT/WTO," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 479-509, September.
    2. Jeheung Ryu & Randall W. Stone, 2018. "Plaintiffs by proxy: A firm-level approach to WTO dispute resolution," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 273-308, June.
    3. Soo Yeon Kim & Gabriele Spilker, 2019. "Global value chains and the political economy of WTO disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 239-260, June.
    4. Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2016. "How Do Countries Respond to Antidumping Filings? Dispute Settlement and Retaliatory Antidumping," Working Papers 2016-04, American University, Department of Economics.
    5. Francesca Parente, 2022. "Settle or litigate? Consequences of institutional design in the Inter-American system of human rights protection," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 39-61, January.
    6. Julia Gray & Philip Potter, 2020. "Diplomacy and the Settlement of International Trade Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 64(7-8), pages 1358-1389, August.
    7. B. Peter Rosendorff & Alastair Smith, 2018. "Domestic political determinants of the onset of WTO disputes," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 243-272, June.

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