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The Illusion of Democratic Credibility

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  • Downes, Alexander B.
  • Sechser, Todd S.

Abstract

Do democracies make more effective coercive threats? An influential literature in international relations argues that democratic institutions allow leaders to credibly signal their resolve in crises, thereby making their threats more likely to work than threats by nondemocracies. This article revisits the quantitative evidence for this proposition, which we call the “democratic credibility hypothesis,” and finds that it is surprisingly weak. Close examination of the data sets most commonly used to test this hypothesis reveals that they contain few successful democratic threats, or indeed threats of any kind. Moreover, these data sets' outcome variables do not properly measure the effectiveness of threats, and therefore yield misleading results. The article then reassesses the democratic credibility hypothesis using the Militarized Compellent Threats data set, a new data set designed specifically to test hypotheses about the effectiveness of coercive threats. The analysis indicates that threats from democracies are no more successful than threats from other states.

Suggested Citation

  • Downes, Alexander B. & Sechser, Todd S., 2012. "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(3), pages 457-489, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:66:y:2012:i:03:p:457-489_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Colton Heffington & Brandon Beomseob Park & Laron K Williams, 2019. "The “Most Important Problem†Dataset (MIPD): a new dataset on American issue importance," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(3), pages 312-335, May.
    2. Eryan Ramadhani, 2019. "Is Assertiveness Paying the Bill? China’s Domestic Audience Costs in the South China Sea Disputes," Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, , vol. 6(1), pages 30-54, April.
    3. Potter, Philip B. K. & Baum, Matthew A., 2014. "Information, Popular Constraint, and the Democratic Peace," Working Paper Series rwp14-015, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    4. Matthew Hauenstein, 2020. "The conditional effect of audiences on credibility," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(3), pages 422-436, May.
    5. Christopher Gelpi, 2017. "Democracies in Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(9), pages 1925-1949, October.
    6. Alex Weisiger, 2014. "Victory without peace: Conquest, insurgency, and war termination," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(4), pages 357-382, September.
    7. Giacomo Chiozza, 2017. "Presidents on the cycle: Elections, audience costs, and coercive diplomacy," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 3-26, January.
    8. Michael C. Horowitz & Philip Potter & Todd S. Sechser & Allan Stam, 2018. "Sizing Up the Adversary," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(10), pages 2180-2204, November.

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