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Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power

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  • Sechser, Todd S.

Abstract

States typically issue compellent threats against considerably weaker adversaries, yet their threats often fail. Why? Expanding on a standard model of international crisis bargaining, I argue that a theory of reputation-building can help shed light on this puzzle. The model casts reputation as a strategic problem, showing that challengers issuing compellent threats have incentives to anticipate the reputation costs that target states incur when appeasing aggressors. If challengers can recognize these costs and offset them with side payments or smaller demands, then even reputation-conscious targets will acquiesce. I argue, however, that military strength contributes to information problems that make challengers more likely to underestimate their targets' reputation costs and insufficiently compensate them. In this way, military power can undermine the effectiveness of compellent threats. The logic is illustrated by the 1939 Russo-Finnish crisis, and the argument's implications for the study of coercive diplomacy are explored.

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  • Sechser, Todd S., 2010. "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(4), pages 627-660, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:64:y:2010:i:04:p:627-660_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Sambuddha Ghosh & Gabriele Gratton & Caixia Shen, 2019. "Intimidation: Linking Negotiation And Conflict," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1589-1618, November.
    2. Oriana Skylar Mastro & David A Siegel, 2023. "Talking to the enemy: Explaining the emergence of peace talks in interstate war," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(3), pages 182-203, July.
    3. Todd S. Sechser, 2011. "Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(4), pages 377-401, September.
    4. Michael C. Horowitz & Philip Potter & Todd S. Sechser & Allan Stam, 2018. "Sizing Up the Adversary," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(10), pages 2180-2204, November.
    5. Andrew H. Kydd & Roseanne W. McManus, 2017. "Threats and Assurances in Crisis Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(2), pages 325-348, February.
    6. Jin Yeub Kim, 2022. "Negotiation statements with promise and threat," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(2), pages 149-164, June.
    7. Robert Schub, 2017. "Unfair fights: Power asymmetry, nascent nuclear capability, and preventive conflict," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(4), pages 431-455, July.
    8. Scott Wolford, 2020. "War and diplomacy on the world stage: Crisis bargaining before third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 235-261, April.
    9. John Tyson Chatagnier, 2015. "Conflict bargaining as a signal to third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 237-268, April.
    10. Ebert, Hannes & Flemes, Daniel & Strüver, Georg, 2012. "The Politics of Contestation in Asia: How Japan and Pakistan Deal with their Rising Neighbors," GIGA Working Papers 206, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

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