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Rulers of the game: central bank independence during the interwar years

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  • Simmons, Beth A.

Abstract

Central bank independence is associated with restrictive monetary choices that can be deflationary within fixed exchange-rate regimes. Because central banks act to counteract domestic inflation, they put a premium on domestic price stability at the expense of international monetary stability. Evidence from fifteen countries between 1925 and 1938 shows that the more independent central banks took more deflationary policies than were necessary for external adjustment. Central banks in general were more restrictive under left-wing governments than they were under more conservative regimes and often were more restrictive than required for external equilibration. This suggests that policies of independent central banks designed to enhance domestic price stability may force deflationary pressures onto other states in the system and potentially destabilize a fixed exchange-rate regime.

Suggested Citation

  • Simmons, Beth A., 1996. "Rulers of the game: central bank independence during the interwar years," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 407-443, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:50:y:1996:i:03:p:407-443_03
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    Cited by:

    1. Hartwell, Christopher A., 2019. "Short waves in Hungary, 1923 and 1946: Persistence, chaos, and (lack of) control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 532-550.
    2. Jean-Baptiste Desquilbet & Nikolay Nenovsky, 2004. "Credibility and Adjustment : Gold Standards versus Currency Boards," CAE Working Papers 11, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
    3. Christie Swanepoel & Philip T. Fliers, 2021. "The fuel of unparalleled recovery: Monetary policy in South Africa between 1925 and 1936," Economic History of Developing Regions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(2), pages 213-244, May.
    4. Colvin, Christopher L. & Fliers, Philip T., 2021. "Going Dutch: How the Netherlands Escaped its Golden Fetters, 1925-1936," QBS Working Paper Series 2021/06, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
    5. Nikolay NENOVSKY, 2010. "Bulgarian Economists during The Great Depression," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 286, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    6. Richard C. K. Burdekin & Leroy O. Laney, 2016. "Fiscal policymaking and the central bank institutional constraint Una Vez Más: New Latin American evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(3), pages 277-289, June.
    7. Christina Schneider, 2010. "Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(1), pages 125-150, January.
    8. Weinan Yan, 2022. "Inequality and the Interwar Gold Standard," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 90-121, January.
    9. Karau, Sören, 2020. "Buried in the vaults of central banks: Monetary gold hoarding and the slide into the Great Depression," Discussion Papers 63/2020, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    10. Pittaluga, Giovanni Battista, 2023. "The Genova Conference of 1922: A Reassessment after 100 Years," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 76(4), pages 567-596.
    11. Kirsten Wandschneider & Nikolaus Wolf, 2010. "Shooting on a moving target: explaining European bank rates during the interwar period," International Journal of Economics and Business Research, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(1/2), pages 31-48.

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