Macropolitical consensus and lateral autonomy in industrial policy: the nuclear sector in Brazil and Argentina

Levels of macropolitical consensus and sectoral institutional autonomy both influence industrial policy. Different combinations of high or low consensus and autonomy help anticipate the respective explanatory relevance of generic industrial models, sectoral agencies' trajectories, and bureaucratic politics. Industrial policy choices thus are not always determined by international market opportunities, relevant domestic endowments, or the political strength of industrial entrepreneurs. The nuclear sectors in Brazil and Argentina are examined in light of this argument. A relatively strong consensus over the generic industrial model and a centralized decision-making process explain state entrepreneurship and foreign technology in Brazil. In contrast, Argentina's emphasis on domestic private entrepreneurial and technical resources can be traced to an absence of macropolitical consensus and to sectoral institutional autonomy. These differences had implications for the process of bargaining with foreign technology suppliers. Levels of consensus and autonomy influence the process of bargaining with foreign technology suppliers through their impact on the size of domestic win-sets, on risks of involuntary defection, on credibility of commitments, and on reduction of uncertainties.