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Reciprocity in trade: the utility of a bargaining strategy

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  • Rhodes, Carolyn

Abstract

Recent works in international relations theory have focused on the value of reciprocity as a means of achieving cooperation in international politics. They argue that even in an anarchic setting in which self-help typifies the behavior of sovereign nation states, the strategy of matching comparable responses to the actions of other nations may educate them over time to cooperate. This article empirically confirms that this assumption is correct. It examines the use of flexible reciprocal bargaining strategies between the United States and its major trading partners in key sectors in which surplus capacity and domestic adjustment difficulties have made commercial conflicts apparent. The outcomes of most of the disputes demonstrate that reciprocity is an effective means of eliciting cooperation from trading partners. Results also illustrate that this cooperation is usually consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) norms of liberal trade and dispute settlement, even when it is inconsistent with the GATT principle of nondiscrimination.

Suggested Citation

  • Rhodes, Carolyn, 1989. "Reciprocity in trade: the utility of a bargaining strategy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(2), pages 273-299, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:43:y:1989:i:02:p:273-299_03
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    Cited by:

    1. David A. Steinberg & Yeling Tan, 2023. "Public responses to foreign protectionism: Evidence from the US-China trade war," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 145-167, January.
    2. Rafat Beigpoor Shahrivar & Duesterhoeft, Ilka & Rogna, Marco & Vogt, Carla, 2023. "A mechanism of proportional contributions for public good games," Ruhr Economic Papers 990, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    3. Sebastian Krapohl & Václav Ocelík & Dawid M. Walentek, 2021. "The instability of globalization: applying evolutionary game theory to global trade cooperation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 31-51, July.
    4. repec:wsr:wpaper:y:2012:i:085 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Senti Richard, 2006. "Argumente für und wider die Reziprozität in der WTO – Die Reziprozität als merkantilistisches Erbe in der geltenden Welthandelsordnung / The merits of reciprocity in the WTO," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 57(1), pages 315-340, January.
    6. Liam F. Beiser-McGrath & Thomas Bernauer & Jaehyun Song & Azusa Uji, 2021. "Understanding public support for domestic contributions to global collective goods," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 166(3), pages 1-20, June.
    7. Hempfing, Alexander & Mundt, Philipp, 2022. "Tie formation in global production chains," BERG Working Paper Series 181, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.

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