CMEA: effective but cumbersome political economy

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is primarily a forum for bilateral bargaining between the Soviet Union and each of the other CMEA countries. The bilateral negotiations are conducted with tremendous concern for Soviet long-term preferences and for the short-term economic-political stability of East European countries. The CMEA provides the Soviet Union with an effective but cumbersome politico-economic policy-making apparatus that is becoming less effective and increasingly cumbersome over time. From the East European perspective, the CMEA tends to solidify the positions of the East European leaders yet generate long-term economic costs. What are the preferences upon which the CMEA is constructed? How are CMEA characteristics related to these preferences? What are the economic costs and benefits to member countries in static and dynamic terms? Why have costs for all member countries risen over time? How is intra-CMEA trade likely to change during the next decade?