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The international organization of Third World debt

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  • Lipson, Charles

Abstract

Third World debt grew very rapidly in the 1970s. Many states, faced with sharply higher costs for energy and manufactured imports, borrowed aggressively in unregulated offshore capital markets. But what constrains sovereign states to repay this debt to commercial banks? Creditors do not turn to their home states to enforce payment; rather, the supervision of sovereign debt is largely a function of commercial banking arrangements, especially lenders' syndicates, and the International Monetary Fund's conditional lending. This political structure, which involves unified private sanctions, has ensured that no state defaults unless it is insolvent or is willing to accept a radical rupture in its international commercial relationships. When the problem is insolvency, creditors routinely convene ad hoc conferences. In conjunction with an IMFapproved stabilization program, creditors can renegotiate debt-service schedules and provide new financing if necessary. These arrangements are distinctive among international economic regimes because they rely on nonstate actors as the primary source of rules, norms, and procedures.

Suggested Citation

  • Lipson, Charles, 1981. "The international organization of Third World debt," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(4), pages 603-631, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:35:y:1981:i:04:p:603-631_03
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    Cited by:

    1. Dorobantu, Sinziana & Müllner, Jakob, 2019. "Debt-side governance and the geography of project finance syndicates," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 161-179.
    2. Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2013. "On the contribution of game theory to the study of sovereign debt and default," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(4), pages 649-667, WINTER.
    3. Alvarez, Sebastian, 2015. "Playing with Fire? Internationalization and Condition of Mexican Banks Prior to The 1982 Debt Crisis," Working Papers unige:55513, University of Geneva, Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History.
    4. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1989. "Un modelo de renegociación continua de la deuda soberana," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 4(1), pages 3-29.
    5. John M. Rothgeb Jr., 1987. "Trojan Horse, Scapegoat, or Non-Foreign Entity," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 31(2), pages 227-265, June.
    6. Alvarez, Sebastian, 2014. "The untold story of the Mexican debt crisis: Domestic banks and external debt, 1977-1989," eabh Papers 14-03, The European Association for Banking and Financial History (EABH).
    7. Flores Zendejas, Juan & Gaillard, Norbert, 2021. "The International Lender of Last Resort Between Scylla and Charybdis," Working Papers unige:152743, University of Geneva, Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History.
    8. -, 1984. "CEPAL Review no.24," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.

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